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1 
CONTRACT AND THE PROBLEM OF FICKLE PEOPLE 
Aditi Bagchi* 
Most theories of promise and contract hold that these 
practices enhance our autonomy.  This Article argues that 
such theories are excessively optimistic about the relationship 
between autonomy and long-term commitment.  Because we 
continuously revise our values and plans, voluntary 
obligations enable earlier plans and express older values at 
the expense of updated plans and values.  The challenge of 
individual moral discontinuity plays out differently for the 
morality of promise and contract, respectively. 
This Article first recasts moral discontinuity, or 
fickleness, as a valuable moral feature of persons, albeit one 
that is in tension with other moral interests.  Agents with 
active moral faculties under conditions of incomplete 
information should continually revise the commitments that 
motivate particular promises.  In fact, even commitments 
simultaneously held by a single agent may be inconsistent 
with each other.  These limitations of consistency and 
continuity reflect persistent agency. 
Individuals differently prioritize stability and 
consistency, on the one hand, and revision and growth, on the 
other.  Each of us can navigate the practice of promise to 
strike a personal balance between these values.  Similar 
calibration is not possible within contract, however.  The legal 
regime of contracting in a liberal state should not undertake 
to enforce a promise for its own sake, lest it underwrite a thick 
conception of personhood that favors moral stability over 
moral evolution.  Contract law must locate its justification 
elsewhere.  Indeed, American contract law avoids embracing 
any dogmatic theory of the relationship between autonomy 
and contract. 
 
 *. Professor of Law, Fordham University Law School.  J.D. Yale Law 
School; M.Sc. Oxford University; A.B. Harvard College.  Many thanks for 
feedback received at presentations at American University Washington College 
of Law, Fordham Law School, Harvard Law School, the University of Amsterdam, 
and Yale Law School.  I am particularly grateful for comments from Hanoch 
Dagan, Abner Greene, Martijn Hesselink, Dori Kimel, David Synder, and 
Benjamin Zipursky. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We often understand promise and contract as practices that 
promote autonomy.1  By making a promise or entering into a contract, 
we are able to alter our moral and legal position, respectively, merely 
by expressing an intention to do so.  You are not obligated to pick up 
your friend from the airport on a given occasion until you promise to 
do so.  You are not obligated to refrain from disparaging a company’s 
products until you agree not to as its employee.  Most of what we owe 
each other does not depend on our communicated intentions in this 
way.  Similarly, most of our legal duties to others do not depend on a 
communicated intent to assume them.  Obligations of our own 
deliberate making are unique. 
Why recognize the power to bind ourselves in this way?  The 
promise to help your friend advances your friendship and the promise 
not to disparage your employer makes it possible to access 
employment.  More generally, David Owens has argued persuasively 
that “normative powers”2 like promise allow us to author our 
normative world, rendering it more of our making.3  When we actively 
shape our normative position, we exercise a distinctive dimension of 
our moral agency.  The resulting responsibility for our moral position 
is important to our self-conception as agents.  Whether we are 
responsible for what we owe others is not a metaphysical fact; it 
depends on whether we take each other to be responsible.  By treating 
 
 1. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 14 (1981) (arguing that when one promises it increases 
one’s future “options,” which in turn promotes autonomy); Jody S. Kraus, The 
Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1617 (2009) 
(“On the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy, promisors are held 
morally accountable for their promises out of respect for their right to choose to 
undertake moral commitments as they see fit.”); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV. 481, 502 
(2008) (“An autonomous life requires . . . meaningful, moral relations with 
others.  Meaningful, moral relations depend on agents having the ability to make 
binding promises.”). 
 2. Neil MacCormick & Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative 
Powers, 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 79, 93–94 (1972). 
 3. See DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 25 (2012). 
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promises and other exercises of normative power as binding, we 
construct our own agency. 
But the binding character of promise and contract is constrictive 
too.  In fact, on their face, promise and contract reduce the choices 
available to us in the future.4  Because you promised to pick up your 
friend, you can no longer spend the afternoon reading, running, or 
staring at the wall, even if you later decide that one of those is a better 
way to spend the afternoon.  Because you agreed not to disparage your 
employer, you may not share views that you come to hold deeply about 
the place where you spend most of your time.  Scholars of promise and 
contract have tended to conclude that because we bind ourselves 
through those practices, the constrictive effect of promise and 
contract does not pose a threat to autonomy.  Pursuant to the 
prevailing view, the power to put ourselves in a new moral position 
enhances our autonomy even if we find ourselves newly encumbered.5 
Such optimism about promise and contract is excessive.  This 
Article does not set out to deny that the normative power to make 
promises and contracts enhances our moral agency.  But that benefit 
comes at a cost.  The same ideal of moral agency that makes promise 
valuable makes the power to revise and reject commitments that we 
have made valuable too.  In fact, the power to revise and reject 
recognizes an important feature of our agency: it is persistent.  That 
is, because we are persistent agents, we continuously revisit our 
values and ends.  We can and should act in a manner that reflects our 
new assessments. 
Of course, the human tendency to break promises and breach 
contracts reflects a variety of weaknesses, including the bare 
temptation of self-interest.  We might fail to follow through on a 
promise because we have already obtained the advantage we sought 
in making the promise and see nothing to gain from performance.  Or 
we might regret an agreement because we learn new facts that reveal 
it to have been a bad deal for us.  Arguably, the assignment of risk in 
contract is intended precisely to deal with this sort of painful 
resolution to factual uncertainty.  However, we also break promises 
 
 4. Self-imposed obligations are only one of the ways in which we may be 
burdened by our former selves.  See, e.g., RICHARD WOLLHEIM, THE THREAD OF 
LIFE 130–32 (Yale Univ. Press 1999) (1984) (describing the potential 
psychological tyranny of memory).  But they are unusual because the practice of 
recognizing self-imposed obligations as binding depends on the positive 
contribution of the practice to our autonomy, all things considered.  By contrast, 
the tyranny of memory is a psychological fact that does not depend on our 
conclusion that memory serves us well (though we might agree that our 
personhood would be even more compromised without memory).  See infra Part 
III (comparing the self-imposed obligation with involuntary duties). 
 5. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 16–17. 
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and breach contracts because we have changed our minds in a morally 
significant way.6 
We often change our minds about the commitments we have 
made because we reject some value on which the commitment was 
based—a life plan, a relationship—or because we reassess the balance 
of the same reasons we had previously considered.7  Even a decision 
to breach that appears at first blush to be a momentary failure of will 
likely reflects some underlying ambivalence in our reasoning about 
the agreement.  At a critical moment, we might revive reasons that 
we earlier rejected or had previously judged to be outweighed by other 
reasons.8  Our tendency to change our minds is easily dismissed as 
fickleness because the internal processes that result in a change of 
mind are often opaque to others.9  All that others see is the same 
person doing something different.10  A change in behavior will appear 
sudden, even though the reasons for the change have been 
accumulating for an agent for some time before the reasons reached 
tipping weight.  Of course, some people are more sympathetic to 
change in others and will project reasonable uncertainty that they 
cannot directly observe.  Similarly, some cultures are more tolerant 
than others of such “multiplicity” within a single person and her life.11 
Regardless of our particular dispositions, we all know from 
subjective experience that we change our minds because we are still 
thinking.  And, as agents, we aim to translate our new thoughts into 
 
 6. Throughout this Article, I will refer to (changes in our) values, ends, and 
identity as “normative” or “moral” matters.  It can be useful to distinguish 
questions about what we owe each other from questions about what we care 
about.  See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, The Importance of What We Care About, in THE 
IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 80, 80–81 (1998).  Nevertheless, although 
self-regarding questions of value, virtue, and identity may not be strictly moral 
in the sense of defining our duties to others, they are normative and even moral 
in the more general sense that they entail “strong evaluation.”  See CHARLES 
TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 4 (1989).  
Moreover, ultimately, the way we construct our own identities has too many 
implications for how we treat others to draw a sharp boundary between these 
matters; questions of identity have a critical moral dimension.  Id. at 28–29. 
 7. Cf. Monika Betzler, Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret, 
in PRACTICAL CONFLICTS: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 197, 198 (Peter Baumann 
& Monika Betzler eds., 2004) (distinguishing regret over right decisions from 
regret over wrong decisions). 
 8. Cf. ALFRED R. MELE, IRRATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON AKRASIA, SELF-
DECEPTION, AND SELF-CONTROL 3–6 (1987) (discussing varieties of akratic action). 
 9. See Simon Blackburn, Has Kant Refuted Parfit?, in READING PARFIT 180, 
180–81 (Jonathan Dancy ed., 1997) (noting that the problem of personal identity 
is a first-person problem); see also Gottlob Frege, The Thought: A Logical Inquiry, 
65 MIND 289, 310–11 (1956) (explaining that one can grasp thoughts about 
oneself that one cannot communicate and that others cannot grasp). 
 10. For a discussion of whether actions can be true, false, or inconsistent and 
how irrationality might figure in practical reasoning, see DAVID PEARS, 
MOTIVATED IRRATIONALITY 121–26 (1984). 
 11. See ROM HARRE, THE SINGULAR SELF: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONHOOD 148–49 (1998). 
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new action.  The reasoning behind a change can be careless or careful, 
just as our initial commitments are sometimes careless and 
sometimes careful.  Either case is an exercise of practical reason, the 
capacity for which defines us as moral agents.12  Persistent agency is 
thus a morally valuable capacity, and it deserves accommodation.  I 
will argue below that the practice of promise cannot accommodate 
persistent agency within itself, but the institution of contract can.  It 
should, and it does. 
To be sure, contract law does not entitle us to impose losses on 
others so that we might indulge our fickleness.  But in several 
respects, contract law is more lenient than its private counterpart—
the morality of promise.13  Promise-making befits individuals who are 
committed to moral stability and prepared to undertake its weighty 
obligations.  Many of us choose to exercise normative power over time 
at the expense of constricting our persistent agency—at least in some 
areas of our lives.  Others might self-consciously take steps to avoid 
moral encumbrances.  Because we are all equally entitled to the 
support that contract law provides in our daily lives, it is a more 
liberal institution than promise.  Contract law facilitates commitment 
without endorsing any one conception of personal virtue over others. 
Many scholarly discussions of promise and contract elaborate 
their relationships with the principle of autonomy.  By contrast, this 
Article’s focus is on the broader concept of agency.  I should therefore 
specify how I use each concept.  I take a moral agent to generate 
reasons for herself and others.  She is an agent in that she is not 
merely responsive to external facts but processes facts in a way that 
makes her decision to act in one way rather than another her own.14  
Because she is a moral agent, her choices reflect moral deliberation, 
or they should.15  And just as she ought to take into account the moral 
claims of others, her interests are of the sort that should be given 
special weight (as compared to other beings) by other moral agents. 
 
 12. See RICHARD MORAN, AUTHORITY AND ESTRANGEMENT: AN ESSAY ON SELF-
KNOWLEDGE 114–18 (2001). 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. My use of the concept of agency is consistent with standard theories of 
agency.  See G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 9 (Cornell Univ. Press 1969) (1957) 
(explaining that intentional actions are those for which the agent answers “Why?” 
with a reason for acting); DONALD DAVIDSON, Agency, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND 
EVENTS 43, 46 (2d ed. 2001) (“[A] man is the agent of an act if what he does can 
be described under an aspect that makes it intentional.”); see also MYLES BRAND, 
INTENDING AND ACTING: TOWARD A NATURALIZED ACTION THEORY 3–5 (1984) 
(“Whenever an action includes the casual consequences of the agent’s bodily 
movements, observation is necessary for him to know what he is doing.”); 
MICHAEL BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 128–29 (1987) 
(contemplating the relation between acting with an intention and intending); 
ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION 103–04 (hardcover ed. 2016). 
 15. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: 
A Kantian Response to Parfit, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101, 101 (1989) (noting that 
the moral agent asks, “What should I do?” (emphasis added)). 
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I take autonomy to be a more robust principle: an autonomous 
person governs herself by reference to the right reasons.16  That is, a 
person can fail to act autonomously where she does not act on the 
moral reasons that apply to her.  Although autonomy is often used 
more broadly to encompass what is here either agency or the capacity 
for autonomy, I am using a more restrictive conception of autonomy 
in order to be able to distinguish systematically between our moral 
interest in exercising agency and our interest in exercising it well.  
Nevertheless, both agency and autonomy drive at the idea of self-
authorship, and such self-authorship is facilitated by promising.  
Only if we share a conception of the person that is well-served by the 
power to promise does the law of contract have noninstrumental 
reasons for helping to construct the normative power of promise in 
the context of legally binding exchange. 
A few years ago, Dori Kimel wrote a book chapter wondering 
whether the autonomy-enhancing effects of promise have caused us 
to overlook or downplay (in theory, at least) the obvious downsides of 
commitment for autonomy.17  People can bind themselves until they 
are too bound up.  Does autonomy not require that we retain the right 
to change our minds? 
Kimel considers a number of problems that promise might pose 
for autonomy, but I will argue that he does not do the challenge 
justice.  His account is thrown off by adopting the starting point of the 
literature on promise: only a morally continuous and unitary person 
can be autonomous.18  Starting there, Kimel misjudges the value of 
changing one’s mind and its relation to a fragmented and 
discontinuous identity.19 
The idea of autonomy that Kimel employs presupposes a more 
basic moral agency.  Because persistent agency is in basic tension 
with commitments across time, the implications of promising for 
autonomy are more ambiguous than Kimel allows.  The power to 
promise is valuable, but normative powers outside promise have 
value too; the power to make a promise sits tightly against the power 
to revise that promise.  The same ambition of agency that motivates 
the basic normative power of promise motivates us to revise our 
commitments in light of evolving values that may coexist in tension 
 
 16. The relationship between agency and autonomy is variously conceived 
but agency is treated here as the prior notion, a prerequisite for autonomy.  The 
idea of autonomy employed is Kantian; it is more demanding than some popular 
uses.  See IMMAUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 40–44 
(James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d. ed. 1993) (1785) (identifying 
autonomy with self-governance by universalizable maxims, i.e., with a 
substantive moral principle, the categorical imperative). 
 17. See Dori Kimel, Personal Autonomy and Change of Mind in Promise and 
in Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 96, 96–99 
(Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014). 
 18. See id. at 99–103 (discussing personal autonomy and a change of mind). 
 19. Id. 
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with each other.  Revision and internal conflict are what we call 
fickleness.  We may conceive ourselves as continuous persons, but we 
rightly accommodate our fickleness too. 
Part II summarizes and suggests limitations in Kimel’s 
arguments “in defense” of promise and contract in the face of the 
value of changing one’s mind.  In doing so, my aim is to show the scope 
of the challenge here, which applies not only to bad promises but also 
promises per se.  Part III argues that agency under nonideal 
conditions, including limited cognitive faculties and limited 
knowledge, requires continuous revision of our basic moral 
commitments.  Some degree of indecision is morally compulsory.  Part 
IV suggests that people reasonably disagree about the value of 
stability and unity and makes sense of why promise and contract 
should diverge in their treatment of regret and reversal.  Promise is 
properly associated with continuity of a singular identity and contract 
appropriately declines to presuppose such a conception of the person.  
This divergence is good, especially in a liberal state.  Part V discusses 
several doctrines that accommodate fickleness. 
II.  DORI KIMEL’S DISCUSSION OF CHANGING ONE’S MIND 
Surprisingly, Kimel’s inquiry is the only extended philosophical 
discussion of this intuitive challenge to modern contract theory.  
Kimel begins by setting out the worry that the implications of promise 
for autonomy are more mixed than the literature on promise has 
allowed.20  If it turns out that promises are bad for autonomy, then on 
his nonconventional view of promise, the idea of promise is just 
illusory—the moral practice exists only if it is endorsable from a 
moral standpoint.  If promise undermines autonomy, there is no such 
thing as promise. 
Kimel sets out to redeem promise and quell fears about 
contract.21  Although making commitments and changing your mind 
are both valuable exercises of autonomy, he does not regard them as 
equally important.  The value of autonomy, he claims, lies in the 
persistent and significant, not the fleeting and trivial.22  He associates 
our interest in changing our mind with spontaneity and associates 
spontaneity with the fleeting and trivial.  Autonomy dictates a moral 
interest in controlling weighty matters that affect the arc of one’s life.  
Promise enhances that capacity at the expense of frivolous indecision. 
Kimel himself is not wholly satisfied with that defense of 
promise.  It rests, after all, on a dubious empirical view of what kinds 
of decisions people are likely to revise.23  More problematically, it 
discounts the value of changing one’s mind per se as distinct from the 
 
 20. See id. at 96–99. 
 21. Id. at 99. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. at 100. 
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value of changing one’s mind about this or that matter.24  Kimel offers 
two additional arguments for why promise might not unduly burden 
the moral interest in changing one’s mind: promisors have the power 
to make promises fault based, and they operate in relationships 
where promisees are obligated to release promisors where a promise 
turns out to be regrettable.25 
Kimel argues that a promisor’s power to moderate her 
commitment attenuates the burden of promise.26  A promisor that 
does not wish to commit herself wholly can promise only “to try” or 
she can promise that she will perform only under specified 
conditions.27  Unfortunately, though this possibility does make 
promise less burdensome, it also seems to make it less valuable.  And, 
in any event, it does not release the later self from the power of the 
former self since it is up to the former self to hedge the promise.  A 
promisor who suspects that the promise she is about to make may 
turn out to be a bad idea can indeed avoid implicating herself too 
much, but a promisor with no such doubts will not take advantage of 
the opportunity to condition her own promise or limit its scope.  Even 
where she does, she necessarily limits her promissory obligation by 
reference to some external constraint (“I promise I will pick you up 
unless I have a work conflict”); the contingency could not be within 
her own control (“I promise I will pick you up unless I come to decide 
that you are not worth the trouble.”).  The latter type of promise is 
illusory, in the language of contract.  Even hedging by reference to 
external constraint may undermine the relational value of the 
promise substantially.  A promise hedged by retaining the bare right 
to change one’s mind is an affirmatively negative signal.  Kimel may 
be right that promisors have wide-ranging formal powers with respect 
to their promises, but they are more constrained if they wish to avail 
themselves of the relational value associated with promise in the first 
place. 
The last mitigating consideration Kimel identifies in defense of 
promise is the duty of promisees to release promisors from promises.28  
That duty is not one that attaches by virtue of their status as 
promisees (though that status gives them the power of release) but in 
light of the relationships in which promising usually takes place.29  
Kimel suggests that in most cases where a promise turns out to be 
especially burdensome, the promisor has a right of release by the 
promisee.30  Presumably, in the context of contractual promises, the 
duty to release is manifested in doctrines of excuse. 
 
 24. Id. at 100–01. 
 25. Id. at 109–11. 
 26. Id. at 106. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 109–11. 
 29. Id. at 109. 
 30. Id. at 109–10. 
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This argument too assumes certain kinds of reasons for wanting 
release from a promise.  In particular, those reasons have to be ones 
that objectively justify breaching the promise, such that the promisee 
has objective reason to release the promisor from it.  Kimel’s 
argument does not contemplate the possibility of changing one’s mind 
where that change of mind is triggered not by a change in the world 
(or information about it) but by a change in oneself.  It might 
sometimes be the case that a promisee will respond to even the latter 
kind of change, but she is unlikely to be bound to release for that 
reason (morally or legally).  This is especially true where the relevant 
change in oneself is precisely a desire to rupture relations with the 
promisee or at least a devaluation of her consideration in an 
exchange. 
Kimel’s defense of contract, or its implications for autonomy, is 
more persuasive than his defense of promise.  He again identifies 
three ways in which contract takes into account the value of changing 
one’s mind.31  First, “[i]t is plausible to think that entirely 
unreciprocated undertakings are particularly likely to become the 
object of a change of mind, or that the capacity to act on a change of 
mind of this sort merits particularly robust protection.”32  Because 
contract law, by virtue of the consideration requirement, enforces 
primarily exchange agreements, most contractual promises are 
reciprocal.33  It is not clear why one would be less likely to regret a 
commitment made for exchange, but Kimel seems right; there is less 
reason to allow one to change one’s mind in that context.  Although a 
promisee might rely on a unilateral promise, the state’s interest in 
facilitating exchange because of the material benefits of a regime that 
allows for cheap, credible commitments justifies its enforcing 
commitments on which one might wish to backtrack.  I expand on this 
point in Part IV. 
Second, Kimel observes that contract does not enforce the 
promise but only the performance interest.34  This is because in most 
cases, courts do not award specific performance.35  Seana Shiffrin has 
critiqued this divergence between the rules of contract and the 
ostensible moral rule that promisors must actually perform.36  Kimel 
seems to imply that the obligation to make the other party whole is 
less burdensome to a contracting party than an obligation to 
perform.37  That is presumably true since, if a party finds damages 
more burdensome, they could just go ahead and perform (assuming 
 
 31. Id. at 114. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 708, 709 (2007). 
 37. Kimel, supra note 17, at 114. 
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the period for performance has not passed).  But the rule that contract 
usually only gives rise to damages is important also for doing just 
what Shiffrin claims: sending a message that a party is not really 
required to perform.38  Contrary to Shiffrin, that message is valuable 
as a legal norm precisely because it allows that the attitude of 
contract law toward a commitment is not so dogmatic as promissory 
norms alone would suggest.  In particular, as I argue further below, 
contract can be regarded as accommodating other values derived from 
autonomy, including an interest being able to reverse course. 
Finally, Kimel points to the fact that freedom of contract is less 
wide ranging than freedom of promise.39  We are not permitted to bind 
ourselves in the most profound ways.  We cannot sell ourselves into 
slavery or indentured servitude.40  We cannot even agree not to work 
for a competitor of an employer on overly broad terms.41  Contract is 
restricted in myriad other ways.  Sometimes it is restricted to protect 
third parties42 and sometimes restrictions appear motivated by 
cultural reasons,43 but sometimes courts and policymakers are 
engaged in straightforward paternalism.44  It is paternalistic, 
however, only if we assume continuity of the person.  My discussion 
below might provide us with a better response to the charge of 
paternalism than does Kimel.  Paternalism involves restricting a 
person for her own benefit.  Relaxing the assumption of continuity, 
we can more easily justify protecting a later self from a former self. 
The basic limitation in Kimel’s defense of promise and contract 
from the standpoint of autonomy is that the value he acknowledges 
in changing one’s mind is really just the value in changing one’s mind 
about what turn out to be bad promises.45  In this respect, his view is 
consistent with that of Stephen Smith, who defended rules limiting 
contracts that impair future freedom on the perfectionist grounds 
that such contracts interfere with promisors’ future well-being.46  
Kimel and Smith justify excusing nonperformance and refusing to 
enforce agreements, respectively, when there is something objectively 
wrong with the initial promise.47 
In fact, Kimel starts his defense of promise by discounting the 
value of changing one’s mind per se, suggesting that spontaneity itself 
does not rival the autonomy interest in the serious and long term, the 
 
 38. Shiffrin, supra note 36, at 722. 
 39. Kimel, supra note 17, at 114. 
 40. Stephen A. Smith, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract, 59 MOD. L. 
REV. 167, 175 (1996). 
 41. Id. at 169. 
 42. Id. at 170. 
 43. Kimel, supra note 17, at 114. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 98. 
 46. Smith, supra note 40. 
 47. Kimel, supra note 17, at 114; Smith, supra note 40, at 173. 
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latter being well served by promise.48  The limitations on the burden 
of promising that he identifies all apply where there is continuity 
between the values of the person who made the promise and values 
of the person bound to perform it.49  That is, the performing person is 
not severely burdened if her values were in complete alignment with 
those of the promising person because the promisor could hedge her 
promise in the appropriate ways.  To the extent the performing person 
wishes to retain the relationships constructed by her former self, she 
can take comfort in the duties those relationships impose on 
promisees to release her from the promise where external 
circumstances warrant such excuse.  But none of the considerations 
highlighted by Kimel mitigate the burden of promise on a promisor 
who has truly changed her mind. 
The challenge posed by the phenomenon of regret to the practice 
of promise does not lie in the imperative to be responsive to objective 
reasons for changing one’s mind about a particular promise.  Just as 
the value of making promises does not lie in conformity with the 
reasons one might have for making a promise, the value of changing 
one’s mind does not lie in the value of conforming with new reasons 
not to keep it.  Keeping one’s promise is valuable because it is 
empowering, but we can shape our normative situation over time only 
if we regard ourselves as continuous persons.  As developed further 
below, changing one’s mind is valuable because we also have reasons 
to render ourselves discontinuous by revising our beliefs and values 
over time.  The presumption of continuity is not straightforwardly 
good for autonomy.  Moral agency is a sufficiently sweeping interest 
that it is in some respects advanced by personal continuity even while 
other aspects lead us to harbor multiple values and commitments in 
an unstable hierarchy and sometimes in outright conflict with one 
another. 
While our usual notion of a moral agent presupposes that she 
operates in the singular, an agent need not be unitary (in the sense of 
cohesive or consistent) either in her beliefs or in the values she 
endorses.  We speak intelligibly of collective agents, whose goals and 
preferences are in flux over time.50  In the political context, we 
recognize a tension between the need for stable political institutions 
and the accountability of democracies to their present populations.51  
On the one hand, a stable constitution makes it possible to undertake 
more elaborate national projects, including the institution building 
 
 48. Kimel, supra note 17, at 99. 
 49. Id. at 99–100. 
 50. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared Intention, in FACES OF INTENTION: 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY 109, 110 (1999) (describing 
intentions of structured social groups); MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 18 
(Princeton Univ. Press 1992) (1989) (discussing plural subjects). 
 51. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 55 (2001). 
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necessary to comply with the demands of justice.52  On the other hand, 
democracy seems to require that institutions and policies be 
responsive to people’s changing values on even constitutional 
questions.53  On the one hand, we desire some national unity in order 
that political processes function and with the legitimacy of proximate 
consensus on deep issues.54  On the other hand, we celebrate 
divergent views and call ourselves liberal for not wishing difference 
away.55  These are tensions we live with.  We differ among ourselves 
on the relative priority of the two competing values.  Some people 
advocate constitutional interpretation by reference to original 
intent,56 while others call for “systematic instability” by way of 
periodic constitutional convention and sunset provisions57 or other 
means of updating the constitutional canon over time.58  Some people 
are nostalgic for greater cultural homogeneity, while others call for 
the most liberal definition of the demos.59  But few would deny, in 
principle, either the values of stability and cohesion, on the one hand, 
or change and diversity, on the other. 
The same tension in our normative commitments applies to the 
person.  The natural person is more cohesive and stable than a 
collective agent only by degree.60  Any given person has a complex 
 
 52. Id. at 37. 
 53. Id. at 174. 
 54. Id. at 70. 
 55. Id. at 68–69. 
 56. See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in 
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 
226, 243–59 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of 
Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2015). 
 57. See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 620 (2008) (describing various 
institutional proposals for promoting constitutional change); see also John Dinan, 
“The Earth Belongs Always to the Living Generation”: The Development of State 
Constitutional Amendment and Revision Procedures, 62 REV. POL. 645, 646 
(2000); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 355, 355 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, The Mandatory Referendum 
on Calling a State Constitutional Convention: Enforcing the People’s Right to 
Reform Their Government, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 421, 422 (1970). 
 58. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
105–17 (2014); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 80 (2010). 
 59. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 120–22 (1989) 
(describing this tension and defining demos inclusively). 
 60. Although this Article does not concern itself with the problem of personal 
identity as such—because I assume that the person who makes a promise is the 
same as the one called upon to perform it—Derek Parfit’s exploration of the 
complexities of psychological continuity were critical to establishing my starting 
point, i.e., fragmentation and instability in individual thinking.  Derek Parfit, 
Personal Identity, in PERSONAL IDENTITY 199, 203 (John Perry ed., 2d ed. 2008) 
(“A person’s mental history need not be like a canal, with only one channel.  It 
could be like a river, with islands, and with separate streams.”); see DEREK 
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 326–29 (1984) (discussing changing 
commitments). 
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conception of the good that is under constant revision.61  Because our 
value set never arrives at a stable equilibrium, at any given moment 
in time there are internal tensions, if not outright contradictions, 
among our commitments.62  Some conflicts are between concrete 
judgments and abstract principles.  Some are among our theoretic 
commitments (e.g., in our aspiration to rival virtues), and others are 
among our judgments across contexts (we may be more relaxed in our 
fidelity to a moral principle in one setting than in another).  No one 
has fully reconciled all her normative beliefs, though some are less 
comfortable with eclecticism (or inconsistency) and others are more 
insistent on consistency (or dogmatism).  Importantly, these internal 
conflicts are genuine internal moral conflicts (i.e., “practical 
conflicts”).63  They are not merely conflicts between reason and 
emotion; emotional responses are only relevant here if they are 
endorsed or consciously adopted based on reasons.64  While the 
possibility of “true” practical conflicts is an open philosophical 
question, the inconsistency in our normative commitments that I 
describe does not depend on the objective reality of the conflict.  That 
is, it might be the case that in every case where our normative 
commitments conflict, one of those commitments is improper or 
reflects false moral reasoning.  If that were true (which I do not 
believe), then any apparent conflict among our normative 
commitments is illusory.65  But as elaborated in Part III below, we do 
not engage in practical reasoning under ideal conditions.  Even if it 
were the case that there are no true practical conflicts, the human 
condition subjects us to such conflict because we cannot resolve all 
moral questions rightly or definitively as would be necessary to avoid 
them. 
The moral capacities we ascribe to persons in the Rawlsian 
framework, i.e., a sense of justice and a capacity to have a conception 
 
 61. A person’s “conception of the good” is her life plan, rooted in philosophical 
and religious belief as well as political and social doctrines.  See JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 127 (rev. ed. 1999).  It is roughly her worldview, especially 
her ideas about what is valuable. 
 62. I refer to inconsistency among our normative judgments and 
commitments and not “self-inconsistency” in the psychological sense, whereby 
one personal trait interferes with actualization of another, and it is the latter that 
the person endorses.  See Augusto Blasi & Robert J. Oresick, Self-Inconsistency 
and the Development of the Self, in THE BOOK OF THE SELF: PERSON, PRETEXT, AND 
PROCESS 69, 73 (Polly Young-Eisendrath & James A. Hall eds., 1987). 
 63. THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 128–29 (Canto ed. 1991). 
 64. I am following Joseph Raz here.  See Joseph Raz, Personal Practical 
Conflicts, in PRACTICAL CONFLICTS: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, supra note 7, at 
172, 177 (“The so-called conflict between reason and the passions is no such 
thing . . . .  [T]alk of such conflict refers to the degree to which one is inclined to 
response to emotion-related reasons and to the degree to which one relies on one’s 
reason in deciding what to do.”). 
 65. See Earl Conee, Against Moral Dilemmas, 91 PHIL. REV. 87, 87–97 (1982). 
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of the good,66 are best understood as active capacities.  Moral agency 
does not consist of passive possession of a static set of beliefs about 
either justice or the good.  Having these capacities means exercising 
them, and this implies in the ordinary life that the work-products of 
these moral capacities are in perpetual flux.  Because the exercise of 
these moral capacities is central to our self-conception as autonomous 
moral agents, we might even look askance at a person who seems 
disinclined to subject her ends to scrutiny, unresponsive to the new 
data on the human condition that each day supplies or wedded to a 
value set whose simplicity belies the complexity of the world through 
which those values should guide her. 
Kimel is the first person since Farnsworth67 to give sustained 
attention to the problem of changing’s one mind.68  It is surprising 
that the philosophical literature on promise has rallied so completely 
around the value to one’s autonomy of being bound.  The aim here is 
not to displace that general proposition but to put into focus a 
countervailing story.  It is also about autonomy, or values related to 
autonomy.  But my account will go farther back than Kimel in 
questioning the presumption that autonomy presupposes a 
continuous and stable self, such that normative powers that operate 
on that presumption come at no cost from the standpoint of autonomy.  
I will suggest instead that we do not have a single, stable identity 
and, as agents subject to cognitive and experiential constraints, we 
should not aspire to have one.  The practice of promise may insist on 
it, but contract law does not expect it of us. 
III.  AGENCY UNDER NONIDEAL CONDITIONS 
Nothing in this Article should be taken to deny the importance of 
a continuous self.  The pragmatic ambitions of contract law, to 
facilitate planning and coordination,69 assume that people have an 
interest in their future states.70  Likewise, the foundational premise 
of contract law, that people know what is good for them and are 
 
 66. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 19 (expanded ed. 2011). 
 67. See generally E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF 
REGRETTED DECISIONS (1998) (discussing the general principles and legal rules 
that permit a person to change their mind). 
 68. See generally Kimel, supra note 17 (discussing changing one’s mind in 
promise and in contract). 
 69. See Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: 
New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939, 2003 (2011) 
(explaining that contract’s moral and economic purpose is to “enable coordination 
on neutral terms in an open and pluralist economic and political order”); see also 
STANLEY I. BENN & RICHARD S. PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC 
STATE 279 (1959); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 7–9 (3d ed. 1999); A. 
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2d ed. 1989). 
 70. For a discussion of the implications of a reductionist account of personal 
identity for self-interest theory, see generally Sydney Shoemaker, Parfit on 
Identity, in READING PARFIT, supra note 9, at 135. 
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usually the best guardians of their own (future) interests, assumes 
continuity of contracting parties.71 
Less parochially, the kind of life to which human beings 
ordinarily aspire has direction and purpose, whether by design or 
retrospective narrative.  Our sense of agency is enhanced by seeing 
things that happen to us as connected with choices we made.  We 
accept responsibility for what follows from those choices.72  Direction, 
purpose, choice, and responsibility are all concepts that apply across 
time: One directs her life over many series of actions.73  One has a 
purpose with respect to actions not yet accomplished.74  One chooses 
what to do going forward.75  And one is responsible for things that 
happened already.76  If these concepts are central to our moral agency, 
as their ubiquity in any discussion of autonomy and agency implies, 
then we cannot do without some self that persists over time. 
But that self cannot be too settled, or else it ceases to be an agent 
in other respects.  After all, at issue here is not personal identity in 
the metaphysical sense.77  I am not addressing the metaphysical 
questions of whether a human being is the same person over time and 
by virtue of what.78  I refer to the identity of an agent in the sense of 
a self-conception, the set of beliefs and values that motivate one’s 
choice to do this and not that or to commit to one thing rather than 
another. 
Moral agents can have moral claims addressed to them and they 
can make claims on others.  In either case, the agent helps generate 
reasons.  As the addressee of other’s moral claims, she recognizes 
their claims as reasons for herself.  As a claimant on others, she 
presents her reasons for recognition by others.  The capacity to 
 
 71. Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 143–44 
(2009). 
 72. See ZENO VENDLER, THE MATTER OF MINDS 118 (L. Jonathan Cohen ed., 
1984). 
 73. See George Wilson & Samuel Shpall, Action, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action/ (explaining that actions are caused by 
an agent’s “desires, intentions, and means-end beliefs”) (last updated Apr. 4, 
2012). 
 74. See id. (“It is also important to the concept of ‘goal directed action’ that 
agents normally implement a kind of direct control or guidance over their own 
behavior.”). 
 75. See id. (explaining that agents act with “intentions for the future”). 
 76. See Andrew Eshleman, Moral Responsibility, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/ (last updated Mar. 26, 
2014) (discussing Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility and the notion that 
agents are responsible for their voluntary actions). 
 77. Mark Johnston, Human Concerns Without Superlative Selves, in 
READING PARFIT, supra note 9, at 149, 174–75 (noting that metaphysical claims 
about personhood bear a contingent relationship with practical commitments). 
 78. For discussion of those questions, in addition to Parfit, supra note 60, see 
generally Stephen Clark, How Many Selves Make Me?, in HUMAN BEINGS 213 
(David Cockburn ed., 1991); and Kathleen Wilkes, How Many Selves Make Me?, 
in HUMAN BEINGS, supra, at 235. 
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generate reasons, or to be a self-generating source of value, depends 
on our being recognized as capable of generating new value and on 
recognizing reasons based on who we are now.79  Otherwise, we would 
be mere vessels for a conception of the good authored by a former self.  
Generating guiding values, or choosing a conception of the good, must 
always be unfinished business or we would not properly be 
characterized as having a capacity to generate value; we would be 
better described as possessing values.  And because recognition as a 
moral agent requires that others recognize our generative capacity, 
these new, revised commitments must have some moral significance 
for where we stand in relation to others.  Others must see us as 
capable of moving around in and reshaping the normative landscape 
(to use Owens’s phrase).80  This means they will expect some 
discontinuity.81 
Inconsistency is not just temporal.  The process of moral change 
does not involve wholesale substitution of one complete conception of 
the good with another at neat intervals.  We are in ongoing 
deliberation; we do not actually achieve reflective equilibrium.82  
Because we experience the world in fragments, at any given moment, 
we too should be fragmented with commitments rising and falling in 
priority, each competing for space in a value set thus deprived of 
either constancy or cohesion.  There is nothing tragic about this 
responsiveness.  It is an ideal of agency, or at least it follows from its 
proper exercise.  We might regard the diversity of views held by an 
individual over time as characteristic of a free mind in the way that a 
“reasonable plurality of conflicting and incommensurable 
[conceptions of good in a society] is seen as the characteristic work of 
practical reason over time under enduring free institutions.”83 
Of course, not everything is properly subject to revision.  We are 
subject to myriad involuntary duties irrespective of what we think 
 
 79. See Lynne McFall, Integrity, in ETHICS AND PERSONALITY: ESSAYS IN 
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 79, 80 (John Deigh ed., 1992) (explaining that the virtue of 
integrity demands as an ideal not only that we espouse the right principles but 
“make our principles, conventional or otherwise, one’s own”); cf. Thomas M. 
Scanlon, Reasons and Passions, in THE CONTOURS OF AGENCY: ESSAYS ON THEMES 
FROM HARRY FRANKFURT 165, 180 (Sarah Buss & Lee Overton eds., 2002) (“What 
we and others regard as particularly significant about us is the considerations we 
regard as reasons and how we respond to them.”). 
 80. See OWENS, supra note 3, at 11. 
 81. See id. at 4–5 (explaining that when an agent communicates an intention 
to impose an obligation on another, the agent is intentionally changing the 
normative situation and must believe that the other party is capable of changing 
his obligations). 
 82. “Reflective equilibrium” is the process by which we attempt to reconcile 
our general beliefs and principles with our judgments about specific situations or 
facts.  RAWLS, supra note 61, at 20.  Rawls suggests that we go back and forth 
among these until the process “yields principles which match our considered 
judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”  Id. 
 83. RAWLS, supra note 66, at 135. 
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about them—just as state powers are limited by universal human 
rights irrespective of the policy agenda of a given government.84  
Moreover, we may not renounce commitments we have undertaken to 
others if doing so would harm them.85  None of these propositions is 
troubled by the arguments here because the imperative to 
accommodate fickleness is a challenge (ultimately withstood) to the 
independent moral force of promises, not to the idea of obligation in 
general.  We do not recognize a duty to not harm others because it is 
good for our own moral agency.86  But we do regard ourselves as bound 
by promises just because we think that recognizing the power to bind 
ourselves in that way is good for our moral agency.  Normative powers 
are uniquely susceptible to the challenge of fickleness because they 
exist only inasmuch as they promote agency, and the phenomenon of 
human fickleness suggests that their implications for agency are 
more ambiguous than philosophers have allowed.87 
In other words, fickle people (or rather, all people, because we are 
all fickle to varying degrees) are subject to a duty not to harm others, 
including by way of promise making and promise breaking.88  The 
question is whether we should recognize an obligation to execute 
promises just because we made them and not merely because 
performance is morally commendable on other grounds, such as 
avoiding harm or promoting good consequences.  Again, my 
contention is not that promises are a poor moral practice all things 
considered.  We can choose whether and how to make promises, and 
in which domains of our life.  Promises are also probably more 
conditional in practice than some theoretical accounts imply.  For all 
these reasons, the challenge of persistent agency can be attenuated, 
though never diffused entirely.  My claim here is not that promises 
are never properly regarded as binding.  Instead, I urge caution with 
respect to the domain of promissory morality and insist that it not 
encroach on contract. 
 
 84. SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING 
123 (1998). 
 85. Marsalis v. La Salle, 94 So. 2d 120, 125 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (“One who 
gratuitously undertakes with another to do an act or to render services which he 
should recognize as necessary to the other’s bodily safety and thereby leads the 
other in reasonable reliance upon the performance of such undertaking is subject 
to liability to the other for bodily harm resulting from the actor’s failure to 
exercise reasonable care to carry out his undertaking.” (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 325 (AM. LAW. INST. 1934))). 
 86. RAWLS, supra note 66, at 114. 
 87. See Jennifer M. Morton, Deliberating for Our Far Future Selves, 16 
ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 809, 823 (2013) (“Cross-temporal authority, 
according to my view, is grounded in sharing a normative perspective with a 
particular future self on what matters.  Whether a current self will share a 
normative perspective with a future self depends on the kind of reasons she has, 
whether her future self will see those reasons, and crucially, whether he future 
self will feel their force in a similar way.”). 
 88. See supra note 85. 
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Thus far, I have emphasized the ways in which changing one’s 
mind reflects the proper exercise of our moral faculties.  However, 
though responsiveness to new information and experiences is an 
ideal, it does reflect the nonideal conditions under which we exercise 
agency.89  If our capacity for reason were perfect and presented with 
complete information about the external world, we might, in 
principle, arrive at a stable set of values and beliefs that would 
generate right reasons in all cases.  In that state of the world, no new 
information would require us to revise our existing views.  Nor would 
self-doubt motivate us to revise settled questions.  As agents, we 
would continue to generate reasons, but the reasons we generate 
would be identical to the ones that we would have generated at any 
earlier moment in time and the same as the ones we would recognize 
at some later point.90  Because our exercise of agency is instead 
inevitably flawed, we can expect the reasons we recognize today to be 
somewhat different from the ones we recognized some time ago.91 
If our capacity for reason were perfect, we could expect the 
reasons we recognize at any given moment to be consistent with each 
other.  The set of beliefs that generate our reasons would be coherent, 
as we would have brought them in perfect alignment with each other.  
But our ability to conceive of the totality of our beliefs, let alone assess 
them as a totality, is limited too.  We do not always see the ways in 
which our beliefs and values conflict or know how to resolve those 
conflicts when we see them.92  Self-awareness might reduce some 
conflict to uncertainty but some internal conflict will persist, 
acknowledged or not.93  This disunity reflects, in part, the fact that 
beliefs and values are updated in response to what we experience, and 
this updating is a good thing—even if our limited faculties render the 
process of updating incomplete.  Given human limits, apparent 
unanimity among a society of separate persons on deep questions of 
life meaning and purpose is likely to reflect some oppressive social or 
 
 89. See Morton, supra note 87, at 812 (offering examples of the nonideal 
conditions of agency, such as “irrationality” and “akrasia”). 
 90. See DAVID O. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 62 
(Sydney Shoemaker et al. eds., 1989) (“We appeal to an agent’s reasons for action 
in explain her behavior.”). 
 91. See Morton, supra note 87, at 821 (“The agent’s confidence in deliberating 
for her future self depends on her taking her future self to have a similar 
normative perspective on the world as she does now, but if she is carving up all 
of her current normative perspective through sheer acts of will how can she 
assume that her future self will see things as she does?”). 
 92. See RAWLS, supra note 61, at 20 (“But if so and these principles match 
our considered convictions of justice, then so far well and good.  But presumably 
there will be discrepancies.”). 
 93. See Caroline Goukens et al., Me, Myself, and My Choices: The Influence 
of Private Self-Awareness on Choice, 46 J. MARKETING RES. 682, 690 (2009) 
(“[S]elf-aware people are more conscious of their presence, attitudes, and 
beliefs.”). 
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political force.94  Similarly, the appearance of total internal cohesion 
within a single person is likely to reflect either a failure to process 
new data or a lack of self-awareness.95 
In making choices, we rely on beliefs and values that we know 
must be faulty but are nevertheless the best we can do at a given 
moment in time.96  We have to rely on those beliefs and values to 
generate reasons for action even as we revise them.  Our revision may 
be more or less deliberate; some will seek out revision while others 
will resist it.  But we cannot altogether refuse to revisit our beliefs 
and values because we should know that they are probably incorrect.  
Such a refusal to revisit would deny our own agency, in that it would 
not undertake to generate reasons anew.  And it would abandon the 
aspiration to autonomy, or self-governance, by right reasons. 
The idea that we should doubt our own beliefs and values and be 
committed to revising them so that we can act on right reasons does 
not presuppose any particular view of the objective status of those 
reasons.97  One might think (though I do not) of the right reasons as 
the best reasons out there to be discovered; our recognition of them 
would amount to seeing them.98  In that case, we would expect each 
attempt to discover right reasons to be somewhat off in the way that 
 
 94. Christoph Hanish, Acting Rightly for the Right Reasons: An Amendment 
to Wolf’s Reason View, 42 TEOREMA: REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE FILOSOFIA 55, 61 
(2015). 
 95. JEFFREY B. RUBIN, A PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR OUR TIME: EXPLORING THE 
BLINDNESS OF THE SEEING I 109 (1998) (“Not only is a monolithic sense of the self 
limiting, but psychological health may involve access to, and comfort with, our 
multidimensionality.  From this perspective, a sense of the complexity, 
multidimensionality, and polyvalency of the self is a developmental milestone 
and achievement.”).  David Velleman also concludes from a philosophical 
standpoint that “wholeheartedness is an object of wishes that do not necessarily 
represent a healthy trend in our thought.”  J. DAVID VELLEMAN, Identification and 
Identity, in SELF TO SELF: SELECTED ESSAYS 330, 346 (2005).  Although he regards 
a coherent and consistent self as something we should aspire to, Velleman allows 
that in the course of the internal debates by which we would try to arrive at 
settled convictions, “we vacillate – which entails speaking in different voices, not 
just hearing them.”  J. DAVID VELLEMAN, The Voice of Conscience, in SELF TO SELF: 
SELECTED ESSAYS, supra, at 110, 113. 
 96. See Morton, supra note 87, at 815 (“This would seem to suggest that in 
deliberating for her far future self, an agent would consider her desires, or the 
objects and states of affairs they present as valuable or good, as a basis on which 
to make her decision.  However, desires as we commonly understand them do not 
have the cross-temporal authority needed for prospective deliberation.”). 
 97. For a range of views on related questions see, for example, ALFRED JULES 
AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 102–14 (2d ed. 1946); BLACKBURN, supra note 
84, at 307; BRINK, supra note 90, at 14; DAVID B. WONG, MORAL RELATIVITY 1 
(1984); James Dreier, Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism, 18 
PHIL. PERSP. 23, 25 (2005); Philippa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical 
Imperatives 81 PHIL. REV. 305, 305 (1972); Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism 
Defended, 84 PHIL. REV. 3, 4 (1975). 
 98. Andrew Reisner, The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the 
Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, 145 PHIL. STUD. 257, 265 (2009). 
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we can expect each attempt to measure the length of a table precisely 
to produce a somewhat different result, given the crudeness of our 
tools as well as our perception.99  Alternatively, one might think that 
there are many reasons that are right, in the sense of “not wrong,” 
but still regard the question of rightness as a transcendental matter 
outside the hands of agents.100  Still another way of thinking about 
the effort to act on right reasons endows the agent with more 
constructive power.101  Her reasons can be regarded as right insofar 
as they are the result of perfect deliberation (i.e., inasmuch as they 
reflect the proper use of her faculty of reason).  We might go further 
and say that right reasons may not be right from any universal 
standpoint, but if they are right for the agent, she cannot be blamed 
for acting on them. 
We do not need to resolve these questions about the nature of 
right reasons to endorse the more limited point on which I rely, which 
is that people are properly motivated to revise their own reasons in 
order to get them right.  And they have reason to think that the 
underlying beliefs and values that generate their reasons are 
probably not correct in any relevant sense.  The imperative to get it 
right reflects our situation as agents, put in the position of always 
choosing.102  It also derives from the principle of autonomy, which 
directs us to govern ourselves not just by any reasons but by the right 
ones.103 
Although the principle of autonomy does important work in 
explaining why we revisit existing beliefs and values, the idea of 
agency helps get the problem started because it makes the activity of 
choosing among reasons central to our self-conception.  The idea that 
we generate reasons for ourselves and others is sometimes collapsed 
under the principle of autonomy.104  Autonomy, or self-governance by 
reason, indeed presupposes an ability to generate reasons.105  But it 
is worth separating out this aspect of self-authorship in the context of 
promising and contract.  It is because agency lies in our capacity to 
generate reasons that it is not inevitable that my present reasons 
coincide with my former reasons; those earlier reasons cannot be 
 
 99. See Stephen B. Vardeman et al., Elementary Statistical Methods and 
Measurement Error, 64 AM. STATISTICIAN 46, 49 (2010) (“The difference between 
devices is explained completely by the difference between the humans involved 
in measurement.”). 
 100. Reisner, supra note 98, at 257. 
 101. See Suzy Killmister, Autonomy and False Beliefs, 164 PHIL. STUD. 513, 
514 (2013) (“[I]t has been suggested than action is autonomous if it is performed 
on the basis of a preference that has been vetted by an agent’s conception of the 
good.”). 
 102. See Kraus, supra note 1, at 1608–09. 
 103. Id. at 1608. 
 104. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 105. See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, 45 SUFFOLK 
UNIV. L. REV. 961, 962–63 (2012). 
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merely inherited.  They have to be endorsed by myself as presently 
constituted.  Reasons created by the fact of promise exclude other 
relevant reasons to keep or breach the promise only insofar as the self 
that made the promise is authorized to bind the self called upon to 
keep it.  We might benefit, as Kimel concludes, from being able to 
assert such authority over ourselves; and if it is just me that I am 
binding, who is to object?106  The problem is that my agency precludes 
us from treating me as just the same at a later time; 107 it forces the 
possibility of rupture.  The present self does not confront my earlier 
reasons as entirely my own where I reject some of the beliefs and 
values that underlay the initial commitment.  These changes of mind 
are not limited to facts concerning the substance of the promise or its 
wisdom but may relate to any aspect of my identity implicated in the 
choice to make that promise. 
The tension created by agency over time may be obscured in most 
contemporary discussions of autonomy—especially in law—which, 
unlike the foundational Kantian work, tend to emphasize its 
jurisdictional aspect.108  We emphasize the prerogative of the self to 
decide and not the underlying capacities that justify that prerogative.  
The principle of autonomy does not just reserve for me the right to 
decide; it directs me to identify the right reasons and it allocates the 
project of governing by reference to those reasons to me.109  The 
jurisdictional side of autonomy, though, concerns only the boundaries 
between people and the powers people have or ought not to have over 
each other.110 
Agency, by contrast, focuses on our relationship with the world 
writ large.111  It does not adjudicate disputes between the rights of 
people against each other but allocates responsibility as between the 
active and the inert.112  Our former selves do not fall cleanly on the 
 
 106. Id. at 964–65 (“Most distinctive for both the law and economics analysis 
of contracts and the morality of promising that underlies Contract as Promise is 
the assumption that individuals (promising or contracting) have a certain 
persistence as entities over time, so that what an individual chooses for his 
future, he is choosing for himself, not for another person who may happen to have 
the same name and DNA; and what he gets by that choice he may not complain 
of, as if it had been chosen for him by someone else.”). 
 107. Again, at issue is not whether I am the same person in the metaphysical 
sense or, more casually, whether we are talking about the same person.  I refer 
to whether the moral agent bears the same set of values and plans.  It is the 
difference, for example, between asking whether there has been a mix-up in the 
parking garage such that the attendant has brought you someone else’s car and 
asking whether the car is in the same condition that it was in at the time you 
parked it.  Only the latter sense of identity is at issue here. 
 108. See Fried, supra note 105, at 961–63 (describing the various 
contemporary discussions of autonomy in the law). 
 109. See Kraus, supra note 1. 
 110. See Fried, supra note 105, at 961–70 (detailing opposing views of 
autonomy in the law). 
 111. See NAGEL, supra note 63, at 37.  
 112. See id. 
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side of the active or inert.  They were active.  It is not surprising, then, 
that our interest in moral agency demands both fidelity and rebellion 
against that former self. 
IV.  DIVERGENT TOLERANCE FOR FICKLENESS 
Thus far, I have made fickleness out to be an unavoidable trait of 
agents under nonideal conditions.  But some of us are clearly more 
fickle than others.  More importantly, this variation is not 
unreflective.  Although we sometimes characterize a person as fickle 
because she regularly fails to control impulses that she does not 
endorse, we also observe considered disagreement about how much 
revision we should aspire to.  Some people pride themselves on being 
constant and only reluctantly let go of beliefs and values as they prove 
untenable.113  They call it personal stability.114  Others pride 
themselves on self-reinvention, shedding identities often.115  They call 
it personal growth.116 
There may be arguments for why a particular person is too fickle 
or rigid, but there is almost certainly a range within which there is 
reasonable disagreement.  Agency cuts in both directions and we lack 
the basis for radically prioritizing either the interest in expanding 
normative powers or the interest in active pursuit of right reasons.117  
Within this range, a state committed to neutrality among conceptions 
of the good cannot take the position that the relative weight that an 
individual assigns these interests is wrong.  Our relative valuations 
are better characterized as an important part of our respective self-
conceptions.118  The relative weight we assign to constancy and 
revision is a metapersonal value. 
Although no single person is likely to endorse either stability or 
instability in its purest form, particular practices may reflect one view 
of the person at the expense of the other.  The essential split I describe 
is between a view of the person as unitary and stable, on the one hand, 
and fragmented and unstable, on the other.  In the remainder of this 
Part, I will argue that a view of the person as essentially unitary and 
stable underlies the practice of promise.  But neither view dominates 
within the institution of contract. 
 
 113. Karen Susman, Seven Tools for Managing Change in Every Area of Your 
Life, 18 COM. L. BULL. 18, 18 (2003). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Janet Weinstein & Linda Morton, Interdisciplinary Problem Solving 
As A Context For Nurturing Intrinsic Values, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 839, 840–41 
(2007). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Korsgaard, supra note 15, at 101–03. 
 118. Our assessment of the relative weight of personal virtues is a clearly 
normative question.  See supra note 6. 
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A. Promise Is Big and Small 
Many scholars have linked promise to autonomy.119  The main 
questions on the table have been: Should we acknowledge a 
promissory principle, under which promisors can obligate themselves 
to promisees by communicating an intention to do so?  Or, formulated 
somewhat differently, why are promises binding?  The answers we 
are given are largely compatible and persuasive on their own terms: 
Promising is a valuable practice because it expands the range of 
undertakings possible.120  It facilitates meaningful relationships of 
trust and dependence.121  And it makes our normative position more 
the product of our making.122  Given that it is a practice we can 
endorse, we should recognize it.  And because it cannot be sustained 
if promisors break their promises, any given promisor is bound to 
comply.123  In the Kantian line of argument used by Charles Fried, 
free-riding on the practice would be to act on material and worldly 
considerations instead of that part of ourselves that identifies with 
universal reason.124  We would, moreover, be treating our promisee 
as a means to our ends, failing to acknowledge her equal status as a 
moral agent. 
Some scholars have denied that promise successfully creates any 
new obligation—the magic of promise, they would claim, really is just 
magic.125  They do not deny that promisors are often required to keep 
their promises but not because of any independent wrong derivative 
from the promise principle.126  We should not lie so we should not 
represent our intentions falsely.  Even where we were sincere at the 
time we issued the promise, we should not harm people by inducing 
reliance and then failing to follow through.  We should not betray 
trust or the legitimate expectations that arise in relationships or as a 
result of patterns of conduct.  A promise skeptic would argue that we 
have confused these reasons to keep promises—grounded in truth, 
trust, and harm—with a bare reason to keep promises as such. 
Promise skeptics must be right that there are many reasons for 
keeping promises outside of the promissory principle.  But they are 
wrong that these reasons exhaust the force of promise.  Although a 
practice of promise is not necessary to sustain our self-conception as 
 
 119. FRIED, supra note 1, at 2; Kraus, supra note 1, at 1608; Daniel Markovits, 
Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1419 (2004); Joseph Raz, 
Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
H.L.A. HART 210, 211 (Peter Michael Stephan Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977). 
 120. Kraus, supra note 1, at 1648. 
 121. Markovits, supra note 119, at 1419–20; Raz, supra note 119, at 228. 
 122. FRIED, supra note 1, at 8; OWENS, supra note 3. 
 123. FRIED, supra note 1, at 9, 16. 
 124. KANT, supra note 16, at 14–15. 
 125. Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121 
(1996); see also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 518 (Lewis Amherst 
Selby-Bigge & Peter H. Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1740). 
 126. HUME, supra note 125, at 516–17. 
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moral agents, it contributes to that picture.  It is probably true that 
for some people, moral agency does not hold any special significance.  
Some people may also be quite bad at promising, handing them out 
“willy-nilly” and then perpetually regretting them almost as quickly 
as they are made.  Others might react viscerally to obligation, 
experience the totality of involuntary duty as almost unbearable, and 
regard the prospect of assuming additional voluntary obligations 
inconceivable.  For all of these people, promise is a bad deal.  But 
surely there are others for whom the practice serves a positive moral 
function.  Since those who would reject promise do so largely for 
reasons that involve a burden on themselves, they have the option of 
opting out and avoiding most of its negative aspects. 
Promise theorists appear to be right about the potential value of 
promise to autonomy, both in the role it plays in establishing a 
continuous identity and in the significance of the normative power.127  
But they are wrong to think that this exhausts the relationship 
between promise and autonomy.  Promise presupposes just that 
continuity which persistent agency tends to undermine.  Instability 
of identity reflects a competing moral value even in those for whom 
promise is a valuable practice all things considered. 
The dimension of autonomy that calls for continuous agency and 
self-authorship constrains promise from the outside.  Contrary to 
Kimel, the practice does not have resources to account for the 
challenge posed by this other dimension of autonomy.128  The value of 
changing one’s mind lies precisely in rejecting the earlier 
commitment, in asserting the right of the new self to revise the 
normative relations created by the former self with new ones that 
reflect present values.  If the value of the initial promise lay in 
“shaping the normative landscape” to match the promisor’s own 
conception of the good, the value of revising the commitment lies in 
reshaping that landscape to match a revised conception of the good.129  
Both types of agency are essentially narcissistic—we want to see 
ourselves in our obligations.  We wish them to be rooted in our values.  
In the making of a promise we may do this on clean ground.  In the 
rejection of a promise (and not just reconsideration of its merits in 
light of new information), we react to ostensibly self-authored 
obligations misaligned with our present self.  There is no way to get 
around the fact that the value of changing one’s mind is antithetical 
to the promissory principle, notwithstanding their common origins in 
our interest in moral agency. 
It is not necessary, though, for promising to reconcile conflict in 
the demands of agency within the practice.  Agents must reconcile the 
tenets of their own agency, and promise comprises but one moral 
 
 127. See Kimel, supra note 17; MacCormick & Raz, supra note 2, at 101. 
 128. See generally Kimel, supra note 17 (discussing personal autonomy and 
promise). 
 129. OWENS, supra note 3. 
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practice, one way in which we cultivate relations with others.  We can 
make it a larger or smaller part of our world on an individual basis.  
Those more keen to create a stable self that consistently navigates 
relations with others will often promise important things.  Those for 
whom the interest in breaking with past commitments is more salient 
can avoid putting those commitments in promissory form except in 
contexts where they desire continuity.  The challenge of regret does 
not disappear altogether, because we can revise our level of 
commitment to stability itself.  But when we come to regret a promise, 
it is an unforced error.  And we can each adjust our personal balance 
between continuity and rupture one promise at a time. 
B. The Distinct Ambitions of Contract 
Contract, though, is different.  It does not just sit alongside an 
array of moral practices.  It is a legal relation that anticipates the use 
of state power to enforce obligations.130  As such, it must reflect a more 
expansive view of its subjects, one that incorporates both the value of 
continuity and the value in fragmentation and instability. 
As a legal institution, contract law must adopt a dual perspective.  
It should take into account the social consequences of contract.  But 
it should also attend to the effects of the law on contracting parties as 
subjects.  Contract law should set up the context in which individuals 
act in a way that makes it possible for them to act morally.  As Shiffrin 
has argued, taking morality into account does not entail 
implementing it; it requires accommodation of the moral subject.131  
More broadly, it requires that contract law operate in the background 
to facilitate rather than undermine moral agency. 
Moral agency is a complicated ideal, though, and the moral 
subject is a complicated person.132  The law is faced with 
accommodating any number of its aspects, some of which are 
conflicting.133  Once one begins the project of accommodation, one is 
enmeshed in rival views of the good.  It is not that contract law should 
not try to accommodate, only that it has to accommodate with 
distance lest it end up burdening a moral subject operating by a 
conception of the good disfavored by the people who make the rules. 
One might expect contract to be still more insistent on continuity 
and cohesion than promise because of the focus by the former on the 
results of contract for others and their interest in being able to predict 
and rely on the words and actions of promisors.  It is no doubt true 
that one of contract’s primary functions is to protect the interests of 
others, including but not limited to promisees.134  But it does so more 
 
 130. Shiffrin, supra note 36, at 721. 
 131. Id. at 716–17. 
 132. See id. at 741 (discussing the complexity of moral agency). 
 133. See id. at 717–19 (illustrating how the legal system should accommodate 
moral agency). 
 134. Markovits, supra note 119, at 1457–58. 
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agnostically than promise theorists would have us believe.  It does not 
assume or promote a thick conception of the person, either by 
insisting on promissory obligation or by protecting the private 
practice.  As I have elsewhere argued, contract has an internal logic 
that is not just an elaboration of promise.135  The legal institution 
protects the interests of others with indifference to the virtue of 
promisors.136 
This agnosticism of contract about the particular makeup of its 
subject, beyond her basic moral capacities, is important because 
partiality to one conception of the person at the expense of another 
would burden the disadvantaged conception severely.  If the view of 
the person as fragmented and discontinuous is given short shrift 
within the practice of promise, individuals who do not relate to that 
practice’s priorities can minimize their participation in the practice 
accordingly.  But one cannot avoid participation in the institution of 
contract without suffering substantial material disadvantage, if 
indeed such avoidance is possible at all.  Assuming one participates 
in a market economy and therefore avails oneself of contract as a legal 
instrument, one is subject to the material consequences attached to 
legally binding agreements.137  Were the institution designed in a 
manner that substantially favored the continuous and stable 
conception of the person, those with a different conception would be 
subject to a regime ill suited to them.  That is not to say that contract 
law might not have reason to penalize the behaviors associated with 
discontinuity and fragmentation, but its reasons for attaching 
material consequence to those behaviors should be based on their 
material consequences for others.  Contract should not invoke the 
autonomy of promisors as justification for the burdens it places on the 
discontinuous and fragmented conception of the person.  If contract is 
appropriately agnostic about the implications of autonomy for 
promise, then it will not rely on the promissory principle as grounds 
for enforcing contractual promises. 
If contract poses greater risks for the discontinuous and 
fragmented conception of the person, it is also uniquely positioned to 
allow its expression.  Notably, the point that follows is not that 
contract can provide affirmative support for or otherwise favor that 
conception at the expense of a stability conception—only that a 
neutral contract law can accommodate fragmented identities in a way 
that is valuable to those for whom that conception resonates. 
Contracts are typically entered at arm’s length.138  That is, at 
least, the assumption on which contract law proceeds.139  As Daniel 
 
 135. Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
709, 711–12 (2011). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 712. 
 139. Id. 
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Markovits has observed, the norms that apply in contract are not the 
ones we expect of intimates and, in fact, special rules apply where 
contracting parties can establish that they do not stand at arm’s 
length to each other.140 
The impersonal relations of contract make it possible to limit the 
dimensions on which we relate to contracting parties.  That power is 
especially important to those for whom agency implies value revision 
and therefore instability of the self.  The thinner the terms on which 
we relate to others, the less our own instability implicates others and 
the less likely we will be bound by terms we regret.  For example, if 
two parties plan a business transaction over a lengthy period, the 
court will usually enforce only those terms that it has specific 
evidence the parties wished to make enforceable.141  Agreements to 
agree are not enforceable, and letters of intent must be shown to have 
operated as legal documents in the understanding of the parties.142  
The effect is to allow parties some latitude in the manner in which 
they conduct themselves interpersonally without fear that they will 
later be held to a term that might have seemed probable given their 
expressed attitude at one moment in time.143  With a few exceptions, 
parties are free to change their minds until they quite deliberately 
forego that prerogative.144 
Contract thus applies a light touch in its reconstruction of 
parties’ contractual relationships.  It does not impute norms unless 
there is either objective evidence that the parties intended those 
terms to be binding or if those terms implicate the material interests 
of others.145  In an earlier work, Kimel argued for the value of personal 
detachment and the role of contract in facilitating relationships at 
 
 140. Markovits, supra note 119, at 1437, 1457–58. 
 141. See, e.g., Alexandria Billiard Co. v. Miloslowsky, 149 N.W. 504, 508 (Iowa 
1914) (“[A party] must show that all the conditions on his part have been complied 
with, that the minds of the parties met upon all the terms and conditions of the 
intended lease; and it must also appear that the proposed lessee was at fault in 
not making the lease.”). 
 142. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wyman, 8 N.Y.S.3d 493, 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2015) (“[An] agreement to agree, where [material] terms are left to future 
negotiations, is unenforceable.”); see also Quake Const., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 
565 N.E.2d 990, 993 (Ill. 1990) (assessing whether the letter of intent at hand 
was an enforceable contract such that a cause of action may be brought by the 
parties). 
 143. See, e.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir. 
1988) (“Neither party needed to fear that the other would mistake an almost 
complete draft for a binding contract and try to foreclose the chance to change 
one’s mind or negotiate further.”). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Boatmen’s Bank of Mid-Missouri v. Crossroads W. Shopping Ctr., 
Ltd., 907 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (“When the parties to a contract 
have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to determination of their 
rights and duties, the term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied 
by the Court. . . . [T]erms may be implied where necessary to give business 
efficacy to the contract.”). 
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arm’s length.146  By making it possible to coordinate, plan together, 
and agree on terms without engaging one’s transactional partner in a 
personal way, contract allows us to interact with others in a greater 
variety of ways.147  Some of that variety, or our desire for it, will reflect 
inconsistency in our own ends.  In this way, contract’s presumption of 
impersonal relations accommodates discontinuity and fragmentation. 
Relationalists doubt both the empirical bases for and the 
normative implications of the presumption of arm’s length relations 
in contract.148  If parties to a contract have expectations beyond those 
of the formal agreement, then arguably the informal norms that 
govern their relation should inform courts’ construction of their legal 
relation.  Economic-minded relationalists like Robert Scott have 
challenged this logic, observing that parties may specifically wish to 
have separate legal and informal arrangements, in part because they 
fear courts will get relational norms wrong.149  Similarly, Lisa 
Bernstein has empirically shown that parties do not want or expect 
courts to enforce all the norms of a trade, in part because courts poorly 
decipher those norms.150  The argument here offers further grounds 
for caution in enforcing norms that were not contemplated as terms; 
enforcing those norms further constrains persons to remain true to 
former selves and their values and preferences.  Where the boundary 
between legal and private norms is well delineated, the material 
interests of contracting partners are protected without compromising 
the interest in changing one’s mind. 
The detachment of contract from promise, to some extent, flows 
from its status as a legal institution.151  Optional moral practices can 
serve one moral interest at the expense of another in a way that 
legally coercive institutions should not.  But a liberal state must be 
especially sensitive to the dual demands of agency on contract.  
According to the influential view articulated by John Rawls, one of 
liberalism’s central tenets is that the state should avoid using its 
coercive powers (including its private law regime) to favor one 
conception of the good over another where both are reasonable and 
 
 146. DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
CONTRACT 134 (2003). 
 147. Id. at 78–80. 
 148. Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 654 (2010) 
(“Although contracts between strangers are, of course, possible, relational 
contract theory emphasizes that many contracts do not show this pattern of 
‘strangership.’”). 
 149. See generally Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational 
Contract, 94 NW. L. REV. 847 (2000) (reviewing the debate and outlining the core 
arguments for and difficulties with alternative strategies for interpreting 
relational contracts). 
 150. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: 
Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1765 (1996) (challenging the idea that courts should seek to discover and apply 
immanent business norms in deciding cases). 
 151. See KIMEL, supra note 146, at 101. 
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compatible with a common political conception of justice.152  Where 
there are two rival conceptions that coexist within persons but which 
we can expect to balance out differently across persons, the state 
should be careful not to implicitly invoke one as a basis for law. 
The reasons for a liberal state to avoid favoring the stability 
conception of the person are not just negative.  Because both that 
conception and the discontinuity conception of the person are so 
closely bound up with a quest for moral agency, liberal states have 
affirmative reason to accommodate both.  There is a thin line between 
neutrality and accommodation;153 it is a dilemma that rears its head 
in many parts of law.  But the line that a liberal regime of contract 
should walk—between favoring a view of the person and 
accommodating it—is familiar, however difficult it may be to identify 
in practice. 
V.  ACCOMMODATING PERSISTENT AGENCY 
Due to its strong resemblance to an ordinary exchange of 
promises, even more so than other areas of law, contract might appear 
to treat us “as if” we were a single person.  But modern contract law 
avoids this presumption in a number of respects.  The legal regime of 
contract manages to allow us to operate on a fiction of stability and 
cohesion vis-à-vis our contracting partners without itself assuming 
this attitude of contracting parties. 
Many features of modern contract law accommodate 
fickleness.154  I will discuss an illustrative set: the principle of 
objectivity, pervasive construction, the requirement of consideration, 
the duty to mitigate, the “American rule” on litigation costs, and the 
possibility of bankruptcy. 
In none of these cases do I claim that the legal rule was motivated 
by a view about personhood or any deliberate design on the part of 
judges to remain neutral among competing views of personhood.  At 
best, the intuitive normative appeal of these legal rules is bolstered 
by their compatibility with fickleness.  At the least, their 
compatibility is a fortuitous moral advantage.   
First, the principle of objectivity155 gives the law a focal point 
apart from the subjective persons that make contract.  By making the 
words and actions of parties the bases for contract, not actual 
agreement, the law can remain agnostic as to the makeup of 
contracting parties and need not pick and choose among potential 
views of contracting subjects.  Inquiry into subjective intent or the 
purposes parties bring to contract requires speculation about what 
contracting parties were actually thinking.  It assumes that each 
 
 152. RAWLS, supra note 61, at 135–40. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See infra notes 164, 166, 177, 180 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778–
79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907). 
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party had an articulable belief about the content of an agreement or 
a fixed purpose with respect to it.  Fickle people lack such beliefs and 
purposes.156  Any attribution will accidentally privilege those aspects 
of a party’s beliefs that she or the other party can document.  One 
might worry that the principle of objectivity is similarly arbitrary in 
giving weight only to the intention that a person happens to 
communicate.  But communication of intent is a morally significant 
act, both because of the potential for reliance and because of the 
control a party exercises over her communicative acts.  The principle 
of objectivity is defensible just on the grounds that parties rely on 
each other’s objective intent.  But it is also the only version of intent 
that does not presuppose a false and narrow view of the person whose 
intent is at issue.  And it is the rule that renders contractual 
obligation most likely to reflect an intention to legally obligate oneself 
(i.e., a choice to prioritize the advantages of a continuous self over a 
discontinuous one in a given context). 
Modern contract law also acknowledges the limits of agreement 
through pervasive construction.157  Greg Klass has discussed our 
common mischaracterization of many acts of construction in contract 
as interpretation.158  Although snuck in under the label of 
interpretation, default rules commonly supply terms where 
agreement is absent.159  By now, we expect ordinary agreements to be 
riddled with important gaps.160  Economists think of these gaps as the 
product of transaction costs, including incomplete information about 
future contingencies and the cost of negotiating terms and drafting 
text that specifies obligations clearly.161  We can also explain such 
gaps by way of parties’ uncertainty over their own ends and 
priorities.162  That uncertainty will amplify each of the classic 
 
 156. In Flower City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Constr. Co., a 
contractor and his subcontractor differently understood the latter’s painting 
duties.  591 F.2d 162, 163–64 (2d Cir. 1979).  Neither party suspected this 
difference.  Id.  Finding the intentions of the parties uncertain, the court held 
that there was no enforceable contract.  Id. at 164. 
 157. See, e.g., Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 1: Francis Lieber, 
NEW PRIVATE L., (Nov. 19, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/19 
/interpretation-and-construction-1-francis-lieber-greg-klass/ (describing the 
interplay between construction and interpretation and describing that 
construction, for Lieber, serves a gap-filling and equitable function). 
 158. See generally Gregory Klass, Interpretation and Construction in 
Contract Law (Jan. 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2971 
&context=facpub (examining the distinction between contract interpretation and 
contract construction and the complex relationship between the two activities). 
 159. Id. at 12. 
 160. See Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 277 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 161. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the 
Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 188–95 (2005). 
 162. Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 396, 413 (2009). 
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transaction costs; it will be that much harder to know what weight to 
give factual uncertainty where our ranking of possible states of the 
world is uncertain.  It is more costly to work out terms with a partner 
where neither party has stable preferences, especially with respect to 
remote contingencies.  The exercise of specification that drafting 
usually entails forces parties to resolve vagueness, but that 
vagueness has to be resolved internally before it can be worked out 
between parties.163  More generally, we might attribute gaps in 
contractual agreement to the limits of intersubjective 
intelligibility.164  That is, we never really know what other people are 
talking about—not completely.165  But this limitation is itself a by-
product (in part) of intrasubjective fragmentation and discontinuity.  
We cannot reach full agreement because neither of us can be counted 
on to have a stable and coherent belief about anything complex, as 
transactions often are.  Under these conditions, subjective agreement 
will be fleeting and complete agreement illusory.  Modern contract 
law requires neither.166  It is increasingly tolerant of incomplete 
agreement and prepared to supply defaults that produce workable, 
enforceable agreements even in the absence of mutual 
understanding.167 
Third, the bargain principle, as expressed in the requirement of 
consideration, identifies those commitments that we are not entitled 
to revise in light of the interests of others.168  It is the doctrine that 
best shows contract to be about something other than promise; 
promises are not enforceable unless they are part of an exchange.169  
Kimel suggests that the requirement of consideration identifies those 
promises which promisors are least likely to regret.170  It is not clear 
why one is less likely to regret an agreement of exchange than a 
unilateral commitment, but it is clear why the state should be more 
interested in holding one to a planned exchange.  Those reasons have 
to do with the harm one can do to contracting partners and the 
interest of the public in a system of commercial exchange in which 
complex transactions can be executed and relied upon.  Those reasons 
eschew a thick view of the person and the reasons a party may have 
 
 163. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 161, at 196–98. 
 164. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 447, 
450 (1995) (defining “intersubjective intelligibility” as “a rule written by one 
person can be substantially understood by another”). 
 165. Cf. id. 
 166. Omri Ben-Shahar, Agreeing to Disagree: Filing Gaps in Deliberately 
Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 393–94 (2004). 
 167. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989). 
 168. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131, 133 (1845) (refusing to enforce a promise 
for lack of consideration); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, 67 
CORNELL L. REV. 640, 641 (1982). 
 169. Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 640. 
 170. Kimel, supra note 17, at 114. 
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for wanting to be regarded as bound and focus instead on the rights 
of others to have her bound. 
Fourth, the duty to mitigate in contract minimizes the burden of 
breach to that necessary to protect a material interest of the 
promisee.171  Qua promisor, the breaching party may not be entitled 
to enlist the nonbreaching party in whatever change of plans resulted 
in her breach.172  But as an agent, the breaching party has an interest 
in changing her mind.173  The duty to mitigate protects that interest 
and in doing so accommodates an aspect of her agency for which her 
position as promisor alone does not account.174 
Fifth, plaintiffs face systematically undercompensatory 
damages.175  Notwithstanding the refrain that the standard remedy 
for breach of contract—expectation damages—is intended to make 
the plaintiff whole,176 nonbreaching parties are not indifferent as 
between performance and damages from the other party.177  Expected 
court damages fall below actual expectation as the result of the 
general rule that damages are limited to the actual,178 foreseeable,179 
and reasonable loss that plaintiff can prove.180  The voluntary payoff 
offered to a nonbreaching party may be lower still.181  Even where 
limiting doctrines do not ultimately apply, expected damages must be 
discounted for uncertainty about whether those doctrines will apply 
(or whether a court may be persuaded that they do) and whether a 
court will otherwise err in its calculation of damages.182  Plaintiffs 
 
 171. M. Golodetz Export Corp. v. S/S Lake Anja, 751 F.2d 1103, 1112 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
 172. Shiffrin, supra note 36, at 724–25. 
 173. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the 
Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 975, 980 (2005). 
 174. Joseph William Singer, Starting Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 565, 576 
(2002). 
 175. Debora L. Threedy, Liquidated and Limited Damages and the Revision 
of Article 2: An Opportunity to Rethink the U.C.C.’s Treatment of Agreed 
Remedies, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 427, 452 (1990). 
 176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (AM. LAW. 
INST. 1981) (“The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies . . . [is] 
compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach.”). 
 177. Michael D. Knobler, Note, A Dual Approach to Contract Remedies, 30 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 415, 427 (2012). 
 178. Inshaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P’ship, 706 N.Y.S.2d 396, 400 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2000) (limiting recovery to actual outlay). 
 179. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147–48 (enshrining the 
foreseeability rule). 
 180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) 
(“A party cannot recover damages for breach of a contract for loss beyond the 
amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty.”). 
 181. William K. Carr & Robert L. Liebross, Wrongs Without Rights: The Need 
for a Strong Federal Common Law of ERISA, 4 STAN. L. & POLY’ REV. 221, 223–
24 (1993). 
 182. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract 
Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2005) (identifying judicial error costs 
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may not be able to document the full extent of their losses, especially 
where those losses involve lost profits.183 
Still, other losses are irrecoverable.  There is limited recovery for 
transaction costs—most notably, the costs of litigation.184  It is the 
American rule that litigants presumptively bear their own costs.185  
Nonpecuniary damages are disallowed in most cases.186  Damages in 
cases of substantial performance,187 or where performance is deemed 
“wasteful,”188 are limited to diminishment in market value.  Equitable 
doctrines of rescission that allow the breaching party to avoid 
damages may also be regarded as limitations on remedy.189  The 
result is that expected damages rarely make a nonbreaching party 
whole.190 
Incomplete remedies effectively weaken the coercive means by 
which contract law motivates parties to perform.  It goes farther than 
most of the other doctrines discussed here in that it accommodates 
the moral interest in changing one’s mind at the material expense of 
the breaching party.  While the competing interests of agency are too 
vague to justify any particular distribution of costs, incomplete 
damages have the effect of penalizing fickleness less harshly than 
would more complete remedies. 
The same can be said of our final example, the institution of 
bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy is also a particularly interesting example 
because cross-national variation in leniency seems to reflect cultural 
and political undercurrents.191  It might be that, though stability and 
 
as among the costs of contract); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific 
Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 277 (1979) (noting that damage awards are often 
undercompensatory). 
 183. Hydraform Prods. Corp. v. Am. Steel & Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339, 
347 (N.H. 1985) (refusing to award speculative lost profits). 
 184. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 
(1975). 
 185. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d). 
 186. See Bohac v. Dep’t of Agric., 239 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding 
that ordinary contract damages exclude “emotional damages” because the scope 
of emotional suffering is unforeseeable). 
 187. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 892 (N.Y. 1921) 
(establishing the doctrine of substantial performance). 
 188. See Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 
1962) (refusing full recovery because the cost of performance was 
disproportionate in relation to the market value of land at issue). 
 189. Doctrines relating to defects in formation, such as mistake, 
misrepresentation, and duress, as well as those relating to changed 
circumstances, such as impracticability or frustration of purpose, clearly have 
other justifications.  But this is true of most doctrines discussed in this Part.  
What matters here is that the effect of these defenses is to reduce the cost of 
changing one’s mind, especially since a potential defense can be the basis for a 
low settlement even where it ultimately lacks merit. 
 190. See supra note 189. 
 191. See generally BRUCE MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE 
AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2009) (documenting the turn to a distinctly 
American attitude toward debt and its relation to cultural shifts). 
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instability rival each other in every person and in every culture, the 
American narrative of self-reinvention makes our own culture 
especially solicitous of fickleness.192  Remaking yourself, which 
necessarily involves casting off the vestiges of the self you reject, is a 
classic American ideal.  Popular culture is rife with narratives of 
redemption.  Sometimes these are stories about fickle individuals who 
learn to walk the line, but sometimes they are stories about stiff, 
repressed people who are liberated and come to see the value in 
spontaneity and change.  Both types of evolution are celebrated but, 
in the balance of classic and modern virtues, Americans may lean 
more than others toward the latter. 
One might also speculate that elites identify with the classic 
virtues more than those unhappy with their lot, and perhaps their 
values do not dominate American legal culture as pervasively as 
elsewhere.193  This could be either because of a populist strain in 
American law (at least bankruptcy law), or just a more liberal one.194  
That is, maybe the state more steadfastly avoids favoring continuity 
as an ideal over a conception of the person as always a work in 
progress.  As noted, these possibilities are merely speculative and 
their empirical premises are highly contestable.  But the fact of cross-
national variation at least reinforces the idea that people legitimately 
vary on this dimension and calls out for an account of the relationship 
between agency and commitment over time richer than the one 
promissory theory has provided us thus far. 
It is characteristic of promissory theory generally, though 
especially of its earlier development by Fried, that it is oddly centered 
on the promisor and her autonomy.195  Even if contract serves the 
principle of autonomy—and by recognizing normative powers, it does, 
among other purposes—contract law does not rest enforceability of 
private agreements on a particular theory of how promising serves 
autonomy.196  It does not rest on promise per se.  To do so would have 
contract adopt the animating values of that practice at the expense of 
other values, like the value of changing one’s mind, that the legal 
institution needs to accommodate too.  Of course, one is not free to 
change one’s mind in contract as we know it.197  But the apparent 
reasons for restricting that aspect of agency have to do with the moral 
claims of others, not some rival dimension of the promisor’s own 
agency.  Our moral interest in changing our minds does not generate 
a right to harm others, but it does generate a reason not to have courts 
hold us to our commitments for our own sake. 
 
 192. See HARRE, supra note 11.  
 193. See MANN, supra note 191, at 257–58. 
 194. See Iain Ramsay, Interest Groups and the Politics of Consumer 
Bankruptcy Reform in Canada, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 379, 384 (2003). 
 195. FRIED, supra note 1. 
 196. Id. at 16. 
 197. Id. at 15. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Contracts are bilateral relationships and much of their 
normative dynamic centers on what contracting parties owe each 
other.198  But the choice by each contracting party to enter a contract, 
as well as the choice to perform it, also reflects her separate moral 
life, including her own plans and priorities.  These two normative 
frameworks, one bilateral and one single-agent-centered, intersect in 
promissory accounts of contract.  Promissory theories regard contract 
as a species of promise.199  Promise creates an obligation to another 
person, but we accept promises as binding in the first place because 
they promote individual autonomy.200  This Article has examined the 
latter contention (i.e., that promises promote autonomy).  I have 
elaborated the ways in which self-created obligations that sustain 
over time undermine persistent agency, which is a premise of 
autonomy as it is construed in most contract theory.  The tension 
between our interest in the normative power of promise, on the one 
hand, and our interest in allowing persistent agency its mark, on the 
other, cannot be diffused within the practice of promise.  But promise 
is a private practice into which people can opt in or out as they see fit.  
Extending its logic into the coercive domain of contract is more 
problematic. 
We enter into employment contracts expecting work of a 
particular kind to give meaning to our life.  We enter into a residential 
lease in order to live in a certain way—in a given place, with 
particular other people (or not).  We buy products or sign up for 
services because we prefer those goods and services over others, and 
we express something about ourselves by spending our money in 
those ways.  Contract, like promise, is enormously powerful because 
it enables us to coordinate with others in service of our values and 
plans.  But sometimes we change our minds and those contracts turn 
out to be disempowering.  This does not mean we should get out of 
them; after all, contract is bilateral and other people’s interests are 
at stake.  But we cannot ground our legal obligation to abide by those 
contracts in a promissory morality that radically privileges our earlier 
agenda over our new values and projects. 
My claims are not radical.  I have not claimed that we cannot be 
described as continuous persons over time in any metaphysical sense.  
Nor have I suggested that our values and plans do not span time.201  
 
 198. Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective 
on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 203 (1997). 
 199. See generally FRIED, supra note 1, at 7–8 (discussing promise as a theory 
of contractual obligation); Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 496 n.30 (treating promise 
and contract as interchangeable). 
 200. FRIED, supra note 1. 
 201. Cf. Samuel Scheffler, Ethics, Personal Identity, and Ideals of the Person, 
12 CAN. J. PHIL. 229, 237 (1982) (“Morality as we normally think of it is intimately 
bound up with a conception of ourselves as agents existing over time with ongoing 
W03_BAGCHI.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/18  7:39 PM 
36 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
Indeed, the idea of a life plan for the moment is incoherent.  The 
picture of the person I have drawn instead is familiar: We endorse 
values that apply over the course of our lives, and we make plans that 
can only be realized over time.  However, we revise our values and we 
revise our plans, and then those new values and plans stretch out into 
the future, no less vulnerable to revision than those that they 
replaced. 
I have argued that people are fickle in this way and also that we 
should endorse this aspect of ourselves as reflective of moral agency.  
How much we endorse it and how much weight we give to this 
dimension of moral agency amounts to our conception of the person.  
We share a conception inasmuch as we all value stability to some 
extent and change to some extent.  We diverge inasmuch we attach 
different weight to those values. 
Promise prioritizes a stable picture of the self over its fickle rival, 
but contract ought not to similarly prioritize moral stability over 
moral evolution.  Although the interests of others limit our right to 
change our minds, contract law avoids any parochial view of moral 
agency and declines to promote a stable conception of the person as 
an ideal in itself.  It is not for contract law to promote a personal ideal 
of internal stability and coherence any more than it would be 
appropriate for private law to promote a dynamic, pluralistic 
worldview.  Liberalism is associated with a special solicitude for 
autonomy,202 but we should regard agnosticism about the 
implications of autonomy for self-commitment as the true liberal 
imperative in contract. 
 
values, plans, personalities, loyalties, and commitments.”).  The arguments of 
this Article are not inconsistent with this claim but grapple with the tension 
between the continuity of our moral agency (persistent agency) and the continuity 
of its work-product (any given set of values and plans). 
 202. See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Autonomy, Liberalism and the New 
Contractualism, 18 LAW CONTEXT: SOCIO-LEGAL J. 57, 57–58 (2000) (discussing 
liberalism and autonomy). 
